activity
20122021
most citedStability of Evolutionary Dynamics on Time Scales

17 citations · 54 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

10 papers

cs.GT2021

Top Score in Axelrod Tournament

Frederick M. Vincent, Dashiell E. A. Fryer

The focus of the project will be an examination of obtaining the highest score in the Axelrod Tournament. The initial design of the highest score in the Axelrod Tournament consiste…

math.DS2015

Entropic Equilibria Selection of Stationary Extrema in Finite Populations

Marc Harper, Dashiell Fryer

We propose the entropy of random Markov trajectories originating and terminating at a state as a measure of the stability of a state of a Markov process. These entropies can be com…

q-bio.PE2014★ 16 cited

The Art of War: Beyond Memory-one Strategies in Population Games

Christopher Lee, Marc Harper, Dashiell Fryer

We define a new strategy for population games based on techniques from machine learning and statistical inference that is essentially uninvadable and can successfully invade (signi…

math.DS2013★ 10 cited

Stationary Stability for Evolutionary Dynamics in Finite Populations

Marc Harper, Dashiell Fryer

We demonstrate a vast expansion of the theory of evolutionary stability to finite populations with mutation, connecting the theory of the stationary distribution of the Moran proce…

math.DS2013★ 1 cited

Mean Evolutionary Dynamics for Stochastically Switching Environments

Marc Harper, Dashiell Fryer, Andrew Vlasic

Populations of replicating entities frequently experience sudden or cyclical changes in environment. We explore the implications of this phenomenon via a environmental switching pa…

math.DS2013★ 1 cited

Incentive Processes in Finite Populations

Marc Harper, Dashiell Fryer

We define the incentive process, a natural generalization of the Moran process incorporating evolutionary updating mechanisms corresponding to well-known evolutionary dynamics, suc…

math.DS2012★ 17 cited

Stability of Evolutionary Dynamics on Time Scales

Marc Harper, Dashiell E. A. Fryer

We combine incentive, adaptive, and time-scale dynamics to study multipopulation dynamics on the simplex equipped with a large class of Riemmanian metrics, simultaneously generaliz…

math.DS2012

The Kullback-Leibler Divergence as a Lyapunov Function for Incentive Based Game Dynamics

Dashiell E. A. Fryer

It has been shown that the Kullback-Leibler divergence is a Lyapunov function for the replicator equations at evolutionary stable states, or ESS. In this paper we extend the result…

cs.GT2012★ 1 cited

The Uniform Distribution in Incentive Dynamics

Dashiell E. A. Fryer

The uniform distribution is an important counterexample in game theory as many of the canonical game dynamics have been shown not to converge to the equilibrium in certain cases. I…

cs.GT2012★ 8 cited

On the Existence of General Equilibrium in Finite Games and General Game Dynamics

Dashiell E. A. Fryer

A notion of incentive for agents is introduced which leads to a very general notion of an equilibrium for a finite game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of these equilibria…