17 citations · 54 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers
Top Score in Axelrod Tournament
Frederick M. Vincent, Dashiell E. A. Fryer
The focus of the project will be an examination of obtaining the highest score in the Axelrod Tournament. The initial design of the highest score in the Axelrod Tournament consiste…
Entropic Equilibria Selection of Stationary Extrema in Finite Populations
Marc Harper, Dashiell Fryer
We propose the entropy of random Markov trajectories originating and terminating at a state as a measure of the stability of a state of a Markov process. These entropies can be com…
The Art of War: Beyond Memory-one Strategies in Population Games
Christopher Lee, Marc Harper, Dashiell Fryer
We define a new strategy for population games based on techniques from machine learning and statistical inference that is essentially uninvadable and can successfully invade (signi…
Stationary Stability for Evolutionary Dynamics in Finite Populations
Marc Harper, Dashiell Fryer
We demonstrate a vast expansion of the theory of evolutionary stability to finite populations with mutation, connecting the theory of the stationary distribution of the Moran proce…
Mean Evolutionary Dynamics for Stochastically Switching Environments
Marc Harper, Dashiell Fryer, Andrew Vlasic
Populations of replicating entities frequently experience sudden or cyclical changes in environment. We explore the implications of this phenomenon via a environmental switching pa…
Incentive Processes in Finite Populations
Marc Harper, Dashiell Fryer
We define the incentive process, a natural generalization of the Moran process incorporating evolutionary updating mechanisms corresponding to well-known evolutionary dynamics, suc…
Stability of Evolutionary Dynamics on Time Scales
Marc Harper, Dashiell E. A. Fryer
We combine incentive, adaptive, and time-scale dynamics to study multipopulation dynamics on the simplex equipped with a large class of Riemmanian metrics, simultaneously generaliz…
The Kullback-Leibler Divergence as a Lyapunov Function for Incentive Based Game Dynamics
Dashiell E. A. Fryer
It has been shown that the Kullback-Leibler divergence is a Lyapunov function for the replicator equations at evolutionary stable states, or ESS. In this paper we extend the result…
The Uniform Distribution in Incentive Dynamics
Dashiell E. A. Fryer
The uniform distribution is an important counterexample in game theory as many of the canonical game dynamics have been shown not to converge to the equilibrium in certain cases. I…
On the Existence of General Equilibrium in Finite Games and General Game Dynamics
Dashiell E. A. Fryer
A notion of incentive for agents is introduced which leads to a very general notion of an equilibrium for a finite game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of these equilibria…