Stability of Evolutionary Dynamics on Time Scales

Abstract

We combine incentive, adaptive, and time-scale dynamics to study multipopulation dynamics on the simplex equipped with a large class of Riemmanian metrics, simultaneously generalizing and extending many dynamics commonly studied in dynamic game theory and evolutionary dynamics. Each population has its own geometry, method of adaptation (incentive), and time-scale (discrete, continuous, and others). Using an information-theoretic measure of distance we give a widely-applicable Lyapunov result for the dynamic. We include a wealth of examples leading up to and beyond the main results.

References in corpus (2)

• The workings of the Maximum Entropy Principle in collective human behavior
• On the Existence of General Equilibrium in Finite Games and General Game Dynamics

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