Incentive Processes in Finite Populations

Abstract

We define the incentive process, a natural generalization of the Moran process incorporating evolutionary updating mechanisms corresponding to well-known evolutionary dynamics, such as the logit, projection, and best-reply dynamics. Fixation probabilities and internal stable states are given for a variety of incentives, including new closed-forms, as well as results relating fixation probabilities for members of two one-parameter families of incentive processes. We show that the behaviors of the incentive process can deviate significantly from the analogous properties of deterministic evolutionary dynamics in some ways but are similar in others. For example, while the fixation probabilities change, their ratio remains constant.

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• Nongaussian fluctuations arising from finite populations: Exact results for the evolutionary Moran process
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Cited by in corpus (1)

• Entropy Rates of the Multidimensional Moran Processes and Generalizations