17 citations · 54 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Stability of Evolutionary Dynamics on Time Scales
Marc Harper, Dashiell E. A. Fryer
We combine incentive, adaptive, and time-scale dynamics to study multipopulation dynamics on the simplex equipped with a large class of Riemmanian metrics, simultaneously generaliz…
The Kullback-Leibler Divergence as a Lyapunov Function for Incentive Based Game Dynamics
Dashiell E. A. Fryer
It has been shown that the Kullback-Leibler divergence is a Lyapunov function for the replicator equations at evolutionary stable states, or ESS. In this paper we extend the result…
The Uniform Distribution in Incentive Dynamics
Dashiell E. A. Fryer
The uniform distribution is an important counterexample in game theory as many of the canonical game dynamics have been shown not to converge to the equilibrium in certain cases. I…
On the Existence of General Equilibrium in Finite Games and General Game Dynamics
Dashiell E. A. Fryer
A notion of incentive for agents is introduced which leads to a very general notion of an equilibrium for a finite game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of these equilibria…