activity
20102026
most citedOn Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets

26 citations · 101 across the 22 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

25 papers

cs.GT2026

Can Labor Markets Function in the Age of AI? The Evaluation Bottleneck in Hiring

Itai Ashlagi, Ramesh Johari, Jon Kleinberg +1

AI-assisted job-search tools have become increasingly popular by making it easier to find and apply to jobs. But by making it easier for applicants to generate and tailor applicati…

econ.TH2026

How to Beat FCFS

Itai Ashlagi, Joseph Root

We study two observable queues with identical service rates, serving agents who arrive stochastically over time. Agents join the queue that minimizes their expected waiting time. A…

econ.TH2026

Auction Design with a Bit of Information

Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Jacob D. Leshno +1

Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can access a binary signal about two bidders` joint values. We explore what kind of information is most valuable to the seller by studying…

cs.DS2025★ 1 cited

Stable Matching with Interviews

Itai Ashlagi, Jiale Chen, Mohammad Roghani +1

In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in m…

cs.GT2025★ 1 cited

From signaling to interviews in random matching markets

Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, Amin Saberi +1

In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signalin…

cs.GT2024

The Power of Two in Token Systems

Itai Ashlagi, Süleyman Kerimov, Omer Tamuz +1

In economies without monetary transfers, token systems serve as an alternative to sustain cooperation, alleviate free riding, and increase efficiency. This paper studies whether a…