26 citations · 101 across the 22 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
How to Beat FCFS
Itai Ashlagi, Joseph Root
We study two observable queues with identical service rates, serving agents who arrive stochastically over time. Agents join the queue that minimizes their expected waiting time. A…
Auction Design with a Bit of Information
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Jacob D. Leshno +1
Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can access a binary signal about two bidders` joint values. We explore what kind of information is most valuable to the seller by studying…
Interviewing Matching in Random Markets
Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi
In many centralized labor markets candidates interview with potential employers before matches are formed through a clearinghouse One prominent example is the market for medical re…
Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Geng Zhao
We study the welfare structure in two-sided large random matching markets. In the model, each agent has a latent personal score for every agent on the other side of the market and…
Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets
Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad, Philipp Strack
We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality th…