26 citations · 101 across the 22 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Stable Matching with Interviews
Itai Ashlagi, Jiale Chen, Mohammad Roghani +1
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in m…
Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints
Itai Ashlagi, Amin Saberi, Ali Shameli
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a…
Maximum Weight Online Matching with Deadlines
Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Chinmoy Dutta +3
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace.…
Maximizing Efficiency in Dynamic Matching Markets
Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Patrick Jaillet +1
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace.…
On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets
Itai Ashlagi, Maximillien Burq, Patrick Jaillet +1
We study dynamic matching in an infinite-horizon stochastic market. While all agents are potentially compatible with each other, some are hard-to-match and others are easy-to-match…
Kidney Exchange in Dynamic Sparse Heterogenous Pools
Itai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet, Vahideh H. Manshadi
Current kidney exchange pools are of moderate size and thin, as they consist of many highly sensitized patients. Creating a thicker pool can be done by waiting for many pairs to ar…