26 citations · 101 across the 22 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers · 1 filter
Can Labor Markets Function in the Age of AI? The Evaluation Bottleneck in Hiring
Itai Ashlagi, Ramesh Johari, Jon Kleinberg +1
AI-assisted job-search tools have become increasingly popular by making it easier to find and apply to jobs. But by making it easier for applicants to generate and tailor applicati…
From signaling to interviews in random matching markets
Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, Amin Saberi +1
In two-sided labor markets, interviews precede matches. Rising interview volumes in medical residency markets have motivated signaling mechanisms that let applicants express intere…
The Power of Two in Token Systems
Itai Ashlagi, Süleyman Kerimov, Omer Tamuz +1
In economies without monetary transfers, token systems serve as an alternative to sustain cooperation, alleviate free riding, and increase efficiency. This paper studies whether a…
Counterbalancing Learning and Strategic Incentives in Allocation Markets
Itai Ashlagi, Jamie Kang, Moran Koren +1
This paper considers the problem of offering a scarce object with a common unobserved quality to strategic agents in a priority queue. Each agent has a private signal over the qual…
Simple Economies are Almost Optimal
Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski +1
Consider a seller that intends to auction some item. The seller can invest money and effort in advertising in different market segments in order to recruit bidders to the aucti…
Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Amin Saberi +2
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which…
Assortment planning for two-sided sequential matching markets
Itai Ashlagi, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Rahul Makhijani +2
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and sup…
Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Participation Guarantees
Itai Ashlagi, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nima Haghpanah
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the…
Stable Matching Mechanisms are Not Obviously Strategy-Proof
Itai Ashlagi, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well kno…
On the Value of Correlation
Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz
Correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated equilibrium in this game, i…
Robust Learning Equilibrium
Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz
We introduce robust learning equilibrium. The idea of learning equilibrium is that learning algorithms in multi-agent systems should themselves be in equilibrium rather than only l…
Matching with Couples Revisited
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a gen…
Mix and Match
Itai Ashlagi, Felix Fischer, Ian A. Kash +1
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and…