7 citations · 8 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
From signaling to interviews in random matching markets
Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, Amin Saberi +1
In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signalin…
The Power of Two in Token Systems
Itai Ashlagi, Süleyman Kerimov, Omer Tamuz +1
In economies without monetary transfers, token systems serve as an alternative to sustain cooperation, alleviate free riding, and increase efficiency. This paper studies whether a…
Simple Economies are Almost Optimal
Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski +1
Consider a seller that intends to auction some item. The seller can invest money and effort in advertising in different market segments in order to recruit bidders to the aucti…
Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Amin Saberi +2
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which…
Assortment planning for two-sided sequential matching markets
Itai Ashlagi, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Rahul Makhijani +2
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and sup…
Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Participation Guarantees
Itai Ashlagi, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nima Haghpanah
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the…