7 citations · 12 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints
Itai Ashlagi, Amin Saberi, Ali Shameli
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a…
Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets
Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad, Philipp Strack
We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality th…
Maximum Weight Online Matching with Deadlines
Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Chinmoy Dutta +3
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace.…
Maximizing Efficiency in Dynamic Matching Markets
Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Patrick Jaillet +1
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace.…