2 citations · 4 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Exponential Communication Separations between Notions of Selfishness
Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas +2
We consider the problem of implementing a fixed social choice function between multiple players (which takes as input a type from each player and outputs an outcome $f(t_…
Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof
Clayton Thomas
We study the strategic simplicity of stable matching mechanisms where one side has fixed preferences, termed priorities. Specifically, we ask which priorities are such that the str…
Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Amin Saberi +2
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which…
Representing All Stable Matchings by Walking a Maximal Chain
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas
The seminal book of Gusfield and Irving [GI89] provides a compact and algorithmically useful way to represent the collection of stable matches corresponding to a given set of prefe…
The Short-Side Advantage in Random Matching Markets
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas
A breakthrough of Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno [AKL17] found that imbalance in the number of agents on either side of a random matching market has a profound effect on the market's…
Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms when Demand Queries are NP-hard
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
State-of-the-art posted-price mechanisms for submodular bidders with items achieve approximation guarantees of [Assadi and Singla, 2019]. Their truthfulnes…