3 citations · 10 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers
Existence of Fair Resolute Voting Rules
Manik Dhar, Kunal Mittal, Clayton Thomas
Among two-candidate elections that treat the candidates symmetrically and never result in a tie, which voting rules are fair? A natural requirement is that each voter exerts an equ…
Characterization of Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices
Clayton Thomas
We study the structure of the set of priority-neutral matchings. These matchings, introduced by Reny (AER, 2022), generalize stable matchings by allowing for priority violations in…
Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Clayton Thomas
We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Tradi…
Strategyproofness-Exposing Descriptions of Matching Mechanisms
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Clayton Thomas
A menu description exposes strategyproofness by presenting a mechanism to player in two steps. Step (1) uses others' reports to describe 's menu of potential outcomes. Step…
Exponential Communication Separations between Notions of Selfishness
Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas +2
We consider the problem of implementing a fixed social choice function between multiple players (which takes as input a type from each player and outputs an outcome $f(t_…
Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof
Clayton Thomas
We study the strategic simplicity of stable matching mechanisms where one side has fixed preferences, termed priorities. Specifically, we ask which priorities are such that the str…