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cs.GT2020★ 3 cited
Exponential Communication Separations between Notions of Selfishness
Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas +2
We consider the problem of implementing a fixed social choice function between multiple players (which takes as input a type from each player and outputs an outcome $f(t_…
econ.TH2020★ 2 cited
Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof
Clayton Thomas
We study the strategic simplicity of stable matching mechanisms where one side has fixed preferences, termed priorities. Specifically, we ask which priorities are such that the str…
cs.GT2020
Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Amin Saberi +2
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which…