8 citations · 8 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Programmable Probabilistic Computer with 1,000,000 p-bits
Navid Anjum Aadit, Xiuqi Zhang, Shuvro Chowdhury +10
Probabilistic computers built from p-bits have been proposed as hardware accelerators for sampling and optimizing Ising models, but existing systems have been confined to a single…
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Roughgarden (2020) initiates the study of Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs), and posits that the on-chain game of a ``good'' TFM should be on-chain simple (OnCS), i.e., incentive c…
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considere…
Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Guy Ishai +1
We conduct an incentivized lab experiment to test participants' ability to understand the DA matching mechanism and the strategyproofness property, conveyed in different ways. We f…
Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier
Shiri Ron, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg +1
We study the communication complexity of truthful combinatorial auctions, and in particular the case where valuations are either subadditive or single-minded, which we denote with…