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cs.GT2025
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Roughgarden (2020) initiates the study of Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs), and posits that the on-chain game of a ``good'' TFM should be on-chain simple (OnCS), i.e., incentive c…
cs.GT2024
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considere…
cs.GT2024
Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier
Shiri Ron, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg +1
We study the communication complexity of truthful combinatorial auctions, and in particular the case where valuations are either subadditive or single-minded, which we denote with…