8 citations · 8 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers · 1 filter
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considere…
Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Guy Ishai +1
We conduct an incentivized lab experiment to test participants' ability to understand the DA matching mechanism and the strategyproofness property, conveyed in different ways. We f…
Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier
Shiri Ron, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg +1
We study the communication complexity of truthful combinatorial auctions, and in particular the case where valuations are either subadditive or single-minded, which we denote with…