3 citations · 10 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2019★ 2 cited
Representing All Stable Matchings by Walking a Maximal Chain
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas
The seminal book of Gusfield and Irving [GI89] provides a compact and algorithmically useful way to represent the collection of stable matches corresponding to a given set of prefe…
cs.GT2019★ 3 cited
The Short-Side Advantage in Random Matching Markets
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas
A breakthrough of Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno [AKL17] found that imbalance in the number of agents on either side of a random matching market has a profound effect on the market's…
cs.GT2019
Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms when Demand Queries are NP-hard
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
State-of-the-art posted-price mechanisms for submodular bidders with items achieve approximation guarantees of [Assadi and Singla, 2019]. Their truthfulnes…