2 citations · 4 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Exponential Communication Separations between Notions of Selfishness
Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas +2
We consider the problem of implementing a fixed social choice function between multiple players (which takes as input a type from each player and outputs an outcome $f(t_…
Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Amin Saberi +2
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which…
Representing All Stable Matchings by Walking a Maximal Chain
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas
The seminal book of Gusfield and Irving [GI89] provides a compact and algorithmically useful way to represent the collection of stable matches corresponding to a given set of prefe…
The Short-Side Advantage in Random Matching Markets
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas
A breakthrough of Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno [AKL17] found that imbalance in the number of agents on either side of a random matching market has a profound effect on the market's…
Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms when Demand Queries are NP-hard
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
State-of-the-art posted-price mechanisms for submodular bidders with items achieve approximation guarantees of [Assadi and Singla, 2019]. Their truthfulnes…