The Free Will Theorem

Abstract

On the basis of three physical axioms, we prove that if the choice of a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. We show that this result is robust, and deduce that neither hidden variable theories nor mechanisms of the GRW type for wave function collapse can be made relativistic. We also establish the consistency of our axioms and discuss the philosophical implications.

31 pages, 6figures

Cited by in corpus (13)

• The Conway-Kochen argument and relativistic GRW models
• Physical limits of inference
• Comment on "The Free Will Theorem"
• The Point Processes of the GRW Theory of Wave Function Collapse
• A Classification of Hidden-Variable Properties
• Collapse models with non-white noises II: particle-density coupled noises
• The Physical World as a Virtual Reality
• Reply to Comments of Bassi, Ghirardi, and Tumulka on the Free Will Theorem
• From Incompleteness Towards Completeness
• Contextuality, Nonlocality and Counterfactual Arguments
• Non-Viability of a Counter-Argument to Bell's Theorem
• Physics and Five Problems in the Philosophy of Mind
• Thou Shalt Not Clone One Bit!