What Does the Free Will Theorem Actually Prove?

Abstract

Conway and Kochen have presented a "free will theorem" (Notices of the AMS 56, pgs. 226-232 (2009)) which they claim shows that "if indeed we humans have free will, then [so do] elementary particles." In a more precise fashion, they claim it shows that for certain quantum experiments in which the experimenters can choose between several options, no deterministic or stochastic model can account for the observed outcomes without violating a condition "MIN" motivated by relativistic symmetry. We point out that for stochastic models this conclusion is not correct, while for deterministic models it is not new.

6 pages, no figures

References in corpus (4)

• The Free Will Theorem
• Comment on "The Free Will Theorem"
• Reply to Comments of Bassi, Ghirardi, and Tumulka on the Free Will Theorem
• Hidden Variables and Nonlocality in Quantum Mechanics

Cited by in corpus (8)

• Bell's theorem and the issue of determinism and indeterminism
• Constraints on determinism: Bell versus Conway-Kochen
• Lorentz-invariant, retrocausal, and deterministic hidden variables
• Quantum Mechanics: From Realism to Intuitionism
• Conway-Kochen and the Finite Precision Loophole
• The Free Will Theorem and the Flash Ontology implicitly assume the Before-Before Experiment and thereby imply free will. Comment on a note by Nicolas Gisin in arXiv:1002.1392v1
• Free Will - A road less travelled in quantum information
• Parameter Independence and Outcome Independence in Dynamical Collapse Theories