Social Dilemmas and Cooperation in Complex Networks

Abstract

In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation and, to some extent the timing of the operations, have a marked influence on the transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can be established at equilibrium. We also study the dynamical behavior of the populations and their evolutionary stability.

12 pages, 7 figures. to appear

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• Critical mass effect in evolutionary games triggered by zealots
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