Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination

Abstract

The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the laws of physics. So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations always rely on detectors to measure the relevant quantum property of single photons. Here we demonstrate experimentally that the detectors in two commercially available QKD systems can be fully remote-controlled using specially tailored bright illumination. This makes it possible to tracelessly acquire the full secret key; we propose an eavesdropping apparatus built of off-the-shelf components. The loophole is likely to be present in most QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes to detect single photons. We believe that our findings are crucial for strengthening the security of practical QKD, by identifying and patching technological deficiencies.

Revised version, rewritten for clarity. 5 pages, 5 figures. To download the Supplementary information (which is in open access), go to the journal web site at http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nphoton.2010.214

References in corpus (2)

• Controlling passively-quenched single photon detectors by bright light
• Breaking a quantum key distribution system through a timing side channel

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