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20032009
most citedEffect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation

234 citations · 672 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for

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8 papers · 1 filter

q-bio.PE200930 cited

Imperfect Imitation Can Enhance Cooperation

Carlos P. Roca, José A. Cuesta, Angel Sánchez

The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic im…

q-bio.PE2008234 cited

Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation

Carlos P. Roca, José A. Cuesta, Angel Sánchez

Spatial structure is known to have an impact on the evolution of cooperation, and so it has been intensively studied during recent years. Previous work has shown the relevance of s…

q-bio.PE2008

Evolving learning rules and emergence of cooperation in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma

Luis G. Moyano, Angel Sánchez

In the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, agents play with each other and update their strategies in every generation according to some microscopic dynamical rule. In its s…

q-bio.PE20075 cited

Emergence and resilience of cooperation in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma via a reward mechanism

Raul Jimenez, Haydee Lugo, Jose A. Cuesta +1

We study the problem of the emergence of cooperation in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma. The pioneering work by Nowak and May showed that large initial populations of cooperators ca…

q-bio.PE2006186 cited

Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics

Carlos P. Roca, Jose A. Cuesta y Angel Sanchez

Evolutionary game theory has traditionally assumed that all individuals in a population interact with each other between reproduction events. We show that eliminating this restrict…

q-bio.PE2005

The importance of selection rate in the evolution of cooperation

Carlos P. Roca, Jose A. Cuesta, Angel Sanchez

How cooperation emerges in human societies is still a puzzle. Evolutionary game theory has been the standard framework to address this issue. In most models, every individual plays…