Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation

Abstract

Spatial structure is known to have an impact on the evolution of cooperation, and so it has been intensively studied during recent years. Previous work has shown the relevance of some features, such as the synchronicity of the updating, the clustering of the network or the influence of the update rule. This has been done, however, for concrete settings with particular games, networks and update rules, with the consequence that some contradictions have arisen and a general understanding of these topics is missing in the broader context of the space of 2x2 games. To address this issue, we have performed a systematic and exhaustive simulation in the different degrees of freedom of the problem. In some cases, we generalize previous knowledge to the broader context of our study and explain the apparent contradictions. In other cases, however, our conclusions refute what seems to be established opinions in the field, as for example the robustness of the effect of spatial structure against changes in the update rule, or offer new insights into the subject, e.g. the relation between the intensity of selection and the asymmetry between the effects on games with mixed equilibria.

Final version, 20 pages, 14 figures

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• Tri-bimaximal lepton mixing from symmetry only
• Ordering in spatial evolutionary games for pairwise collective strategy updates
• Maximal atmospheric neutrino mixing from texture zeros and quasi-degenerate neutrino masses
• The topological issues of cooperation