Imperfect Imitation Can Enhance Cooperation

Abstract

The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic imitative rules whereas it increases with unconditional imitation. To study the transition between both regimes, we propose a new evolutionary rule, which stochastically combines unconditional imitation with another imitative rule. We find that, surprinsingly, in many social dilemmas this rule yields higher cooperative levels than any of the two original ones. This nontrivial effect occurs because the basic rules induce a separation of timescales in the microscopic processes at cluster interfaces. The result is robust in the space of 2x2 symmetric games, on regular lattices and on scale-free networks.

4 pages, 4 figures

References in corpus (5)

• Statistical mechanics of complex networks
• Evolutionary games on graphs
• Phase diagrams for Prisoner's Dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices
• New paradoxical games based on Brownian ratchets
• Brownian motion and gambling: from ratchets to paradoxical games

Cited by in corpus (5)

• Coevolution of strategies and update rules in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks
• Social imitation vs strategic choice, or consensus vs cooperation in the networked Prisoner's Dilemma
• Evolutionary Dynamics of Populations with Conflicting Interactions: Classification and Analytical Treatment Considering Asymmetry and Power
• A multi-state voter model with imperfect copying
• Coordination and equilibrium selection in games: the role of local effects