138 citations · 589 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for
16 papers
Integrating upstream and downstream reciprocity stabilizes cooperator-defector coexistence in others-only public goods games
Tatsuya Sasaki, Satoshi Uchida, Isamu Okada +2
Human cooperation persists among strangers in large, well-mixed populations despite theoretical predictions of difficulties, leaving a fundamental evolutionary puzzle. While upstre…
The evolution of cooperation and diversity by integrated indirect reciprocity
Tatsuya Sasaki, Satoshi Uchida, Isamu Okada +1
Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation in human societies. There are two types of indirect reciprocity: upstream and downstream. Coope…
A norm knockout method on indirect reciprocity to reveal indispensable norms
Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isamu Okada, Satoshi Uchida +1
Although various norms for reciprocity-based cooperation have been suggested that are evolutionarily stable against invasion from free riders, the process of alternation of norms a…
The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks
Tatsuya Sasaki, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isamu Okada +1
Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation in social networks. Although it is known that two of the maj…
Evolution of cooperation and costly incentives in the continuous snowdrift game
Tatsuya Sasaki
Game theory research on the snowdrift game has showed that gradual evolution of the continuously varying level of cooperation in joint enterprises can demonstrate evolutionary merg…
The evolution of conditional moral assessment in indirect reciprocity
Tatsuya Sasaki, Isamu Okada, Yutaka Nakai
Indirect reciprocity is a major mechanism in the maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Indirect reciprocity leads to conditional cooperation according to social n…
Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment
Tatsuya Sasaki, Isamu Okada, Yutaka Nakai
Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, ind…
Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement
Xiaojie Chen, Tatsuya Sasaki, Matjaz Perc
Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introd…
Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game
Tatsuya Sasaki, Isamu Okada
It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the sno…
Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations
Tatsuya Sasaki, Satoshi Uchida, Xiaojie Chen
Punishment is a popular tool when governing commons in situations where free riders would otherwise take over. It is well known that sanctioning systems, such as the police and cou…
Unchecked strategy diversification and collapse in continuous voluntary public good games
Tatsuya Sasaki, Åke Brännström, Isamu Okada +1
Cooperation or defection and participation or withdrawal are well-known options of behavior in game-like activities in free societies, yet the co-evolutionary dynamics of these beh…
Preemptive punishment and the emergence of sanctioning institutions
Tatsuya Sasaki, Satoshi Uchida, Xiaojie Chen
In explaining altruistic cooperation and punishment, the challenging riddle is how transcendental rules can emerge within the empirical world. Game-theoretical studies showed that…
Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games
Tatsuya Sasaki, Satoshi Uchida
Properly coordinating cooperation is relevant for resolving public good problems such as clean energy and environmental protection. However, little is known about how individuals c…
Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
Satoshi Uchida, Tatsuya Sasaki
Stern-judging is one of the best-known assessment rules in indirect reciprocity. Indirect reciprocity is a fundamental mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. It relies on mutu…
The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
Tatsuya Sasaki
Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives…
The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion
Tatsuya Sasaki, Satoshi Uchida
The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly ass…