24 citations · 57 across the 43 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers · 1 filter
Revenue Guarantee Equivalence between Dominant-Strategy and Bayesian Mechanisms
Nir Bachrach, Yi-Chun Chen, Inbal Talgam-Cohen +2
In auction design with limited information about bidders' value distributions, we provide an optimality foundation for dominant-strategy mechanisms. We show that simple dominant-st…
An Introduction to Contract Theory for Computer Scientists
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
This survey introduces contract design to computer scientists: using outcome-based payments to incentivize effort. We discuss applications that motivate a computational approach to…
Ex-ante versus Ex-post: Egalitarian Facility Location Mechanism Design
Zohar Barak, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
We study the facility location mechanism design problem where strategic agents report locations in Euclidean space and the mechanism outputs a single facility location. Each ag…
Optimal Auction Design for Constrained Buyers
Batya Berzack, Rotem Oshman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
We study single-parameter, multi-buyer auctions in which buyers are subject to constraints that affect their bidding strategy. Such constraints arise in many real-world auction set…
Teaming Up with AI: Coordination and Cooperation
Nicole Immorlica, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Successful diffusion of AI in the workforce hinges on the economic value that AI brings to human endeavors. Bringing AI into the workforce is more than deploying a powerful new tec…
ZEBRA: Zero-shot Budgeted Resource Allocation for LLM Orchestration
May Hamri, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
As autonomous agents increasingly execute end-to-end tasks under fixed monetary budgets, the pressing open question shifts from whether the budget is respected, to how to spend it…
Adaptive Contracts for Cost-Effective AI Delegation
Eden Saig, Tamar Garbuz, Ariel D. Procaccia +2
When organizations delegate text generation tasks to AI providers via pay-for-performance contracts, expected payments rise when evaluation is noisy. As evaluation methods become m…
Online Contract Design
Elad Lavi, Hadas Shachnai, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
We initiate the study of online contracts, which integrate the game-theoretic considerations of economic contract theory, with the algorithmic and informational challenges of onlin…