24 citations · 57 across the 43 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler +2
A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for extracting revenue: when selling a single item to bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d.…
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler +2
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some , $v(S…
Approximate Modularity Revisited
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Set functions with convenient properties (such as submodularity) appear in application areas of current interest, such as algorithmic game theory, and allow for improved optimizati…
When Are Welfare Guarantees Robust?
Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Jan Vondrák
Computational and economic results suggest that social welfare maximization and combinatorial auction design are much easier when bidders' valuations satisfy the "gross substitutes…