24 citations · 57 across the 43 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort
Tal Alon, Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Economic theory distinguishes between principal-agent settings in which the agent has a private type and settings in which the agent takes a hidden action. Many practical problems,…
Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidl…
Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies
Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi +1
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items in a model with goods, chores, and copies, as a unified framework for studying: (1)~the existence of EFX and other solution concept…
Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation
Ameer Amer, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Interdependent values make basic auction design tasks -- in particular maximizing welfare truthfully in single-item auctions -- quite challenging. Eden et al. recently established…
Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency
Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash +1
We study contract design for welfare maximization in the well known "common agency" model of [Bernheim and Whinston, 1986]. This model combines the challenges of coordinating multi…
Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading…
Strategic Classification in the Dark
Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Itay Eilat +2
Strategic classification studies the interaction between a classification rule and the strategic agents it governs. Under the assumption that the classifier is known, rational agen…