24 citations · 57 across the 43 of their papers we have counts for
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econ.TH2018
Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design
Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how…
cs.GT2018★ 3 cited
Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman +2
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with items and two subadditive bidders. A -approximation can be guaranteed…
cs.GT2018
Simple versus Optimal Contracts
Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
We consider the classic principal-agent model of contract theory, in which a principal designs an outcome-dependent compensation scheme to incentivize an agent to take a costly and…