1 citations · 2 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
RANDAO Manipulation in the Presence of MEV
Kaya Alpturer, Nicholas Hope, S. Matthew Weinberg
Ethereum's randomness beacon (RANDAO) is well-known to be manipulable, and prior work [AW24] computes the precise fraction of blocks a strategic proposer can propose. The fraction…
Selfish Mining under General Stochastic Rewards
Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, S. Matthew Weinberg
Selfish miners selectively withhold blocks to earn disproportionately high revenue. The vast majority of the selfish mining literature focuses exclusively on block rewards. Carlste…
Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum
Kaya Alpturer, S. Matthew Weinberg
It is well-known that RANDAO manipulation is possible in Ethereum if an adversary controls the proposers assigned to the last slots in an epoch. We provide a methodology to compute…
Contracting with a Learning Agent
Guru Guruganesh, Yoav Kolumbus, Jon Schneider +4
Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions…
Undetectable Selfish Mining
Maryam Bahrani, S. Matthew Weinberg
Seminal work of Eyal and Sirer (2014) establishes that a strategic Bitcoin miner may strictly profit by deviating from the intended Bitcoin protocol, using a strategy now termed *s…