5 citations · 11 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
Reputation Effects with Endogenous Records
Harry Pei
A patient firm interacts with a sequence of consumers. The firm is either an honest type who supplies high quality and never erases its records, or an opportunistic type who choose…
Reputation Effects under Short Memories
Harry Pei
I analyze a novel reputation game between a patient seller and a sequence of myopic consumers, in which the consumers have limited memories and do not know the exact sequence of th…
Reputational Bargaining and Inefficient Technology Adoption
Harry Pei, Maren Vairo
A buyer and a seller bargain over the price of an object. Both players can build reputations for being obstinate by offering the same price over time. Before players bargain, the s…
Robust Implementation with Costly Information
Harry Pei, Bruno Strulovici
We study whether a planner can robustly implement a state-contingent social choice function when (i) agents must incur a cost to learn the state and (ii) the planner faces uncertai…
Misspecified Beliefs about Time Lags
Yingkai Li, Harry Pei
We examine the long-term behavior of a Bayesian agent who has a misspecified belief about the time lag between actions and feedback, and learns about the payoff consequences of his…
A Reputation for Honesty
Drew Fudenberg, Ying Gao, Harry Pei
We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player facing a sequence of short-run opponents makes an…