5 citations · 10 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Misspecified Beliefs about Time Lags
Yingkai Li, Harry Pei
We examine the long-term behavior of a Bayesian agent who has a misspecified belief about the time lag between actions and feedback, and learns about the payoff consequences of his…
A Reputation for Honesty
Drew Fudenberg, Ying Gao, Harry Pei
We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player facing a sequence of short-run opponents makes an…
Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games
Yingkai Li, Harry Pei
We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type…
Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment
Harry Pei
I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her…
Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost
Harry Pei
I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and…
Reputation for Playing Mixed Actions: A Characterization Theorem
Harry Pei
A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his myopic opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed…