5 citations · 11 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Misspecified Beliefs about Time Lags
Yingkai Li, Harry Pei
We examine the long-term behavior of a Bayesian agent who has a misspecified belief about the time lag between actions and feedback, and learns about the payoff consequences of his…
A Reputation for Honesty
Drew Fudenberg, Ying Gao, Harry Pei
We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player facing a sequence of short-run opponents makes an…
Crime Aggregation, Deterrence, and Witness Credibility
Harry Pei, Bruno Strulovici
We present a model for the equilibrium frequency of offenses and the informativeness of witness reports when potential offenders can commit multiple offenses and witnesses are subj…
Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games
Yingkai Li, Harry Pei
We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type…
Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment
Harry Pei
I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her…
Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost
Harry Pei
I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and…