62 citations · 128 across the 42 of their papers we have counts for
47 papers
Strict Fairness at What Cost? Envy-Free Contracts with Subsidies
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
We study algorithmic fair contract design, where a principal designs task-level contracts and fairly delegates a set of tasks to a set of agents. Prior work reveals a fairness-reve…
Robust Aggregation of Calibrated Forecasts
Xinxiang Guo, Yingkai Li, Yifen Mu
Decision-makers often rely on multiple probabilistic forecasts that are individually calibrated but need not be fully informative. We develop a framework for aggregating such forec…
Going Public: Communication in Collective Decisions
Zhicheng Du, Yingkai Li, Boli Xu
A principal and agents can launch a project if the principal proposes it and at least agents accept. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an ex ante unk…
Allocating Resources under Strategic Misrepresentation
Yingkai Li, Xiaoyun Qiu
We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on…
Anonymous Pricing in Large Markets
Yaonan Jin, Yingkai Li
We study revenue maximization when a seller offers identical units to ex ante heterogeneous, unit-demand buyers. While anonymous pricing can be worse than optimal i…
Screening for Choice Sets
Tan Gan, Yingkai Li
We study a screening problem in which an agent privately knows which actions or technologies are feasible and can disclose only a subset to a principal. Once disclosed, feasible op…
Three Tiers and Thresholds: Incentives in Private Market Investing
Jussi Keppo, Yingkai Li
This paper studies optimal contract design in private market investing, focusing on internal decision making in venture capital and private equity firms. A principal relies on an a…
Fair Team Contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
A principal selects a team of agents for collaborating on a joint project. The principal aims to design a revenue-optimal contract that incentivizes the team of agents to exert cos…
Scale-robust Auctions
Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Yingkai Li
We study auctions that are robust at any scale, i.e., they can be applied to sell both expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximation of the optimal re…
Algorithmic Fair Contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
We initiate the algorithmic study of fair contract design. A principal assigns multiple tasks to heterogeneous agents and chooses task-level linear contracts; agents differ in cost…
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity
Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Linda Cai, Yiding Feng +2
We quantify the value of the monopoly's bargaining power in terms of competition complexity--that is, the number of additional bidders the monopoly must attract in simple auctions…
Multi-Project Contracts
Tal Alon, Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen +3
We study a new class of contract design problems where a principal delegates the execution of multiple projects to a set of agents. The principal's expected reward from each projec…
Multi-Dimensional Screening with Endogenous Information Disclosure
Yang Cai, Yingkai Li, Jinzhao Wu
We study multi-product monopoly pricing where the seller jointly designs the selling mechanism and the information structure for the buyer to learn his values. Unlike the case with…
Dynamics and Contracts for an Agent with Misspecified Beliefs
Yingkai Li, Argyris Oikonomou
We study a single-agent contracting environment where the agent has misspecified beliefs about the outcome distributions for each chosen action. First, we show that for a myopic Ba…
Learning and Communication Towards Unanimous Consent
Yingkai Li, Boli Xu
A principal and an agent can launch a project under unanimous consent. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an underlying state, and the agent privately knows his ow…
Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions
Yang Cai, Yingkai Li, Jinzhao Wu
This paper studies a joint design problem where a seller can design both the signal structures for the agents to learn their values, and the allocation and payment rules for sellin…
Incentivizing Forecasters to Learn: Summarized vs. Unrestricted Advice
Yingkai Li, Jonathan Libgober
How should forecasters be incentivized to acquire the most information when learning takes place over time? We address this question in the context of a novel dynamic mechanism des…
Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules
Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan, Yingkai Li
We study a sender-receiver game in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. We ask how the receiver should commit, in a…
Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination
Yingkai Li, Xiaoyun Qiu
We study allocation mechanisms that utilize costly signaling as a screening tool. A social planner aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the weighted sum of agents' utilities…
Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty
Tal Alon, Paul Dütting, Yingkai Li +1
We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model, in which actions require different amounts of effort, and the agent privately knows his ability that determines his cost of effor…
Optimal Scoring Rules for Multi-dimensional Effort
Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan, Yingkai Li +1
This paper develops a framework for the design of scoring rules to optimally incentivize an agent to exert a multi-dimensional effort. This framework is a generalization to strateg…
Budget Pacing in Repeated Auctions: Regret and Efficiency without Convergence
Jason Gaitonde, Yingkai Li, Bar Light +2
We study the aggregate welfare and individual regret guarantees of dynamic \emph{pacing algorithms} in the context of repeated auctions with budgets. Such algorithms are commonly u…
Exploration and Incentivizing Participation in Randomized Trials
Yingkai Li, Aleksandrs Slivkins
Participation incentives is a well-known issue inhibiting randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in medicine, as well as a potential cause of user dissatisfaction for RCTs in online p…
Making Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets
Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Yingkai Li +1
A prevalent assumption in auction theory is that the auctioneer has full control over the market and that the allocation she dictates is final. In practice, however, agents might b…