62 citations · 128 across the 42 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Making Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets
Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Yingkai Li +1
A prevalent assumption in auction theory is that the auctioneer has full control over the market and that the allocation she dictates is final. In practice, however, agents might b…
Almost (Weighted) Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores
Bo Li, Yingkai Li, Xiaowei Wu
In this paper, we study how to fairly allocate m indivisible chores to n (asymmetric) agents. We consider (weighted) proportionality up to any item (PROPX) and show that a (weighte…
Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information
Yingkai Li
We consider a model of a data broker selling information to a single agent to maximize his revenue. The agent has a private valuation of the additional information, and upon receiv…
Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Nicole Immorlica, Yingkai Li +1
We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside…
Revelation Gap for Pricing from Samples
Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li
This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, in which a single mechanism is designed to achieve approximately optimal performance on every prior distribution from a giv…