62 citations · 128 across the 42 of their papers we have counts for
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econ.TH2023★ 1 cited
Incentivizing Forecasters to Learn: Summarized vs. Unrestricted Advice
Yingkai Li, Jonathan Libgober
How should forecasters be incentivized to acquire the most information when learning takes place over time? We address this question in the context of a novel dynamic mechanism des…
econ.TH2023
Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules
Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan, Yingkai Li
We study a sender-receiver game in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. We ask how the receiver should commit, in a…
econ.TH2023
Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination
Yingkai Li, Xiaoyun Qiu
We study allocation mechanisms that utilize costly signaling as a screening tool. A social planner aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the weighted sum of agents' utilities…