62 citations · 128 across the 42 of their papers we have counts for
28 papers · 1 filter
Strict Fairness at What Cost? Envy-Free Contracts with Subsidies
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
We study algorithmic fair contract design, where a principal designs task-level contracts and fairly delegates a set of tasks to a set of agents. Prior work reveals a fairness-reve…
Anonymous Pricing in Large Markets
Yaonan Jin, Yingkai Li
We study revenue maximization when a seller offers identical units to ex ante heterogeneous, unit-demand buyers. While anonymous pricing can be worse than optimal i…
Three Tiers and Thresholds: Incentives in Private Market Investing
Jussi Keppo, Yingkai Li
This paper studies optimal contract design in private market investing, focusing on internal decision making in venture capital and private equity firms. A principal relies on an a…
Fair Team Contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
A principal selects a team of agents for collaborating on a joint project. The principal aims to design a revenue-optimal contract that incentivizes the team of agents to exert cos…
Scale-robust Auctions
Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Yingkai Li
We study auctions that are robust at any scale, i.e., they can be applied to sell both expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximation of the optimal re…
Algorithmic Fair Contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
We initiate the algorithmic study of fair contract design. A principal assigns multiple tasks to heterogeneous agents and chooses task-level linear contracts; agents differ in cost…
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity
Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Linda Cai, Yiding Feng +2
We quantify the value of the monopoly's bargaining power in terms of competition complexity--that is, the number of additional bidders the monopoly must attract in simple auctions…
Multi-Project Contracts
Tal Alon, Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen +3
We study a new class of contract design problems where a principal delegates the execution of multiple projects to a set of agents. The principal's expected reward from each projec…
Multi-Dimensional Screening with Endogenous Information Disclosure
Yang Cai, Yingkai Li, Jinzhao Wu
We study multi-product monopoly pricing where the seller jointly designs the selling mechanism and the information structure for the buyer to learn his values. Unlike the case with…
Dynamics and Contracts for an Agent with Misspecified Beliefs
Yingkai Li, Argyris Oikonomou
We study a single-agent contracting environment where the agent has misspecified beliefs about the outcome distributions for each chosen action. First, we show that for a myopic Ba…
Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions
Yang Cai, Yingkai Li, Jinzhao Wu
This paper studies a joint design problem where a seller can design both the signal structures for the agents to learn their values, and the allocation and payment rules for sellin…
Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty
Tal Alon, Paul Dütting, Yingkai Li +1
We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model, in which actions require different amounts of effort, and the agent privately knows his ability that determines his cost of effor…
Optimal Scoring Rules for Multi-dimensional Effort
Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan, Yingkai Li +1
This paper develops a framework for the design of scoring rules to optimally incentivize an agent to exert a multi-dimensional effort. This framework is a generalization to strateg…
Budget Pacing in Repeated Auctions: Regret and Efficiency without Convergence
Jason Gaitonde, Yingkai Li, Bar Light +2
We study the aggregate welfare and individual regret guarantees of dynamic \emph{pacing algorithms} in the context of repeated auctions with budgets. Such algorithms are commonly u…
Exploration and Incentivizing Participation in Randomized Trials
Yingkai Li, Aleksandrs Slivkins
Participation incentives is a well-known issue inhibiting randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in medicine, as well as a potential cause of user dissatisfaction for RCTs in online p…
Almost (Weighted) Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores
Bo Li, Yingkai Li, Xiaowei Wu
In this paper, we study how to fairly allocate m indivisible chores to n (asymmetric) agents. We consider (weighted) proportionality up to any item (PROPX) and show that a (weighte…
Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Nicole Immorlica, Yingkai Li +1
We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside…
Revelation Gap for Pricing from Samples
Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li
This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, in which a single mechanism is designed to achieve approximately optimal performance on every prior distribution from a giv…
Your College Dorm and Dormmates: Fair Resource Sharing with Externalities
Jiarui Gan, Bo Li, Yingkai Li
We study a fair resource sharing problem, where a set of resources are to be shared among a group of agents. Each agent demands one resource and each resource can serve a limited n…
Optimization of Scoring Rules
Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li, Liren Shan +1
We characterize the optimal reward functions (scoring rules) that incentivize an agent to acquire information and report it truthfully to the principal. The optimal scoring rules l…
Selling to Non-linear Agents: A Demand-Based Auction
Yiding Feng, Jason Hartline, Yingkai Li
Auctions allocate scarce goods, from car licenses to online advertising, to buyers whose utilities are often not linear in money, as with budgets or risk aversion. We ask how a sel…
Benchmark Design and Prior-independent Optimization
Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Yingkai Li
This paper compares two leading approaches for robust optimization in the models of online algorithms and mechanism design. Competitive analysis compares the performance of an onli…
Approximately Maximizing the Broker's Profit in a Two-sided Market
Jing Chen, Bo Li, Yingkai Li
We study how to maximize the broker's (expected) profit in a two-sided market, where she buys items from a set of sellers and resells them to a set of buyers. Each seller has a sin…
Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility
Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li
The revenue optimal mechanism for selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values is complex for agents with linear utility (Myerson,1981) a…