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20182026
most citedElection Manipulation on Social Networks with Messages on Multiple Candidates

6 citations · 39 across the 63 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2022Show all

10 papers · 1 filter

cs.LG2022

A Unifying Framework for Online Optimization with Long-Term Constraints

Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi +2

We study online learning problems in which a decision maker has to take a sequence of decisions subject to long-term constraints. The goal of the decision maker is to maximize…

cs.LG2022★ 3 cited

Sequential Information Design: Learning to Persuade in the Dark

Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi +2

We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receive…

cs.GT2022★ 2 cited

The Power of Media Agencies in Ad Auctions: Improving Utility through Coordinated Bidding

Giulia Romano, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi +1

The increasing competition in digital advertising induced a proliferation of media agencies playing the role of intermediaries between advertisers and platforms selling ad slots. W…

cs.LG2022★ 1 cited

Best of Many Worlds Guarantees for Online Learning with Knapsacks

Andrea Celli, Matteo Castiglioni, Christian Kroer

We study online learning problems in which a decision maker wants to maximize their expected reward without violating a finite set of resource constraints. By casting the learn…

cs.GT2022★ 1 cited

Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomization

Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (called contract) so as to incentivize the agent to take a costl…

cs.GT2022★ 2 cited

Bayesian Persuasion Meets Mechanism Design: Going Beyond Intractability with Type Reporting

Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information so as to influence the behavior of self-interested receivers. In the last years, a growing…

cs.GT2022★ 1 cited

Efficiency of Ad Auctions with Price Displaying

Matteo Castiglioni, Diodato Ferraioli, Nicola Gatti +2

Most of the economic reports forecast that almost half of the worldwide market value unlocked by AI over the next decade (up to 6 trillion USD per year) will be in marketing&sales.…

cs.GT2022★ 1 cited

Public Signaling in Bayesian Ad Auctions

Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi +2

We study signaling in Bayesian ad auctions, in which bidders' valuations depend on a random, unknown state of nature. The auction mechanism has complete knowledge of the actual sta…

cs.GT2022

Signaling in Posted Price Auctions

Matteo Castiglioni, Giulia Romano, Alberto Marchesi +1

We study single-item single-unit Bayesian posted price auctions, where buyers arrive sequentially and their valuations for the item being sold depend on a random, unknown state of…

cs.LG2022★ 1 cited

Safe Online Bid Optimization with Return on Investment and Budget Constraints

Matteo Castiglioni, Alessandro Nuara, Giulia Romano +3

In online marketing, the advertisers aim to balance achieving high volumes and high profitability. The companies' business units address this tradeoff by maximizing the volumes whi…