activity
20182024
most citedElection Manipulation on Social Networks with Messages on Multiple Candidates

6 citations · 26 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

17 papers

cs.LG20231 cited

Bandits with Replenishable Knapsacks: the Best of both Worlds

Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +1

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The tr…

cs.LG2022

A Unifying Framework for Online Optimization with Long-Term Constraints

Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi +2

We study online learning problems in which a decision maker has to take a sequence of decisions subject to long-term constraints. The goal of the decision maker is to maximize…

cs.LG20223 cited

Sequential Information Design: Learning to Persuade in the Dark

Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi +2

We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receive…

cs.GT20222 cited

The Power of Media Agencies in Ad Auctions: Improving Utility through Coordinated Bidding

Giulia Romano, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi +1

The increasing competition in digital advertising induced a proliferation of media agencies playing the role of intermediaries between advertisers and platforms selling ad slots. W…

cs.GT20221 cited

Efficiency of Ad Auctions with Price Displaying

Matteo Castiglioni, Diodato Ferraioli, Nicola Gatti +2

Most of the economic reports forecast that almost half of the worldwide market value unlocked by AI over the next decade (up to 6 trillion USD per year) will be in marketing&sales.…

cs.GT20221 cited

Public Signaling in Bayesian Ad Auctions

Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi +2

We study signaling in Bayesian ad auctions, in which bidders' valuations depend on a random, unknown state of nature. The auction mechanism has complete knowledge of the actual sta…