6 citations · 39 across the 63 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers · 1 filter
Persuading Voters in District-based Elections
Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti
We focus on the scenario in which an agent can exploit his information advantage to manipulate the outcome of an election. In particular, we study district-based elections with two…
Public Bayesian Persuasion: Being Almost Optimal and Almost Persuasive
Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti
Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-recei…
Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of Symmetry
Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi +1
Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design…