6 citations · 16 across the 24 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Fair Share Allocations for Almost All Agents
Tomer Ezra, Tamar Garbuz
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. Our main result guarantees every agent her exact AnyPrice Share (APS) whenever the total entitl…
Improved Impossibility Bounds for Maximin Share Allocations
Tomer Ezra, Tamar Garbuz
The maximin share (MMS) is a central fairness benchmark for allocating indivisible items, but it need not be simultaneously attainable even under additive preferences. While extens…
Welfare Approximation in Multilateral Trade
Tomer Ezra, Aadityan Ganesh, Aviad Rubinstein
We introduce the study of \emph{multilateral trade}: a mechanism-design problem in which a single potential trade involves agents and can be executed only if all agents agr…
Money Burning Mechanism Design: From Welfare to Surplus
Tomer Ezra
We settle the worst-case approximability of consumer-surplus maximization in general multidimensional mechanism-design environments. We do so through two black-box reductions from…