6 citations · 16 across the 24 of their papers we have counts for
36 papers
Fair Share Allocations for Almost All Agents
Tomer Ezra, Tamar Garbuz
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. Our main result guarantees every agent her exact AnyPrice Share (APS) whenever the total entitl…
Improved Impossibility Bounds for Maximin Share Allocations
Tomer Ezra, Tamar Garbuz
The maximin share (MMS) is a central fairness benchmark for allocating indivisible items, but it need not be simultaneously attainable even under additive preferences. While extens…
Welfare Approximation in Multilateral Trade
Tomer Ezra, Aadityan Ganesh, Aviad Rubinstein
We introduce the study of \emph{multilateral trade}: a mechanism-design problem in which a single potential trade involves agents and can be executed only if all agents agr…
Money Burning Mechanism Design: From Welfare to Surplus
Tomer Ezra
We settle the worst-case approximability of consumer-surplus maximization in general multidimensional mechanism-design environments. We do so through two black-box reductions from…
Black-Box Lifting and Robustness Theorems for Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Multi-agent contract design has largely evaluated contracts through the lens of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). This focus, however, is not without loss: In general, the principal can…
Multi-Project Contracts
Tal Alon, Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen +3
We study a new class of contract design problems where a principal delegates the execution of multiple projects to a set of agents. The principal's expected reward from each projec…
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Secretary
Tomer Ezra, Tamar Garbuz
We study the classic single-choice prophet secretary problem through a resource augmentation lens. Our goal is to bound the -competition complexity for different classes of…
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities with Correlations
Tomer Ezra, Tamar Garbuz
We initiate the study of the prophet inequality problem through the resource augmentation framework in scenarios when the values of the rewards are correlated. Our goal is to deter…
Prophet Inequality from Samples: Is the More the Merrier?
Tomer Ezra
We study a variant of the single-choice prophet inequality problem where the decision-maker does not know the underlying distribution and has only access to a set of samples from t…
Universal Optimization for Non-Clairvoyant Subadditive Joint Replenishment
Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi, Michał Pawłowski +2
The online joint replenishment problem (JRP) is a fundamental problem in the area of online problems with delay. Over the last decade, several works have studied generalizations of…
Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design, paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper…
Contract Design for Sequential Actions
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
We introduce a novel model of contracts with combinatorial actions that accounts for sequential and adaptive agent behavior. As in the standard model, a principal delegates the exe…
Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang
In Bayesian online settings, every element has a value that is drawn from a known underlying distribution, which we refer to as the element's identity. The elements arrive sequenti…
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities
Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting +3
We study the classic single-choice prophet inequality problem through a resource augmentation lens. Our goal is to bound the -competition complexity of different t…
Multi-Parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization
Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker
We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximizat…
Contract Design Beyond Hidden-Actions
Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi, Matteo Russo
In the classical principal-agent hidden-action contract model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. In order to complete the task, the agent chooses an…
On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
We study two combinatorial contract design models -- multi-agent and multi-action -- where a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to others. In both settings, the…
The Importance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Combinatorial Bayesian Settings
Tomer Ezra, Tamar Garbuz
We study the measure of order-competitive ratio introduced by Ezra et al. [2023] for online algorithms in Bayesian combinatorial settings. In our setting, a decision-maker observes…
Fair Division with Interdependent Values
Georgios Birmpas, Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi +1
We introduce the study of designing allocation mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods in settings with interdependent valuation functions. In our setting, there is a se…
Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost
Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Pandora's problem is a fundamental model in economics that studies optimal search strategies under costly inspection. In this paper we initiate the study of Pandora's problem with…
Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the h…
Prophet Inequalities via the Expected Competitive Ratio
Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser +2
We consider prophet inequalities under downward-closed constraints. In this problem, a decision-maker makes immediate and irrevocable choices on arriving elements, subject to const…
"Who Is Next in Line?'' On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin +1
We introduce a new measure for the performance of online algorithms in Bayesian settings, where the input is drawn from a known prior, but the realizations are revealed one-by-one…
Combinatorial Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset o…