2 citations · 2 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
We introduce a model of competing agents in a prophet setting, where rewards arrive online, and decisions are made immediately and irrevocably. The rewards are unknown from the out…
Secretary Matching with General Arrivals
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin +1
We provide online algorithms for secretary matching in general weighted graphs, under the well-studied models of vertex and edge arrivals. In both models, edges are associated with…
On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
We study secretary problems in settings with multiple agents. In the standard secretary problem, a sequence of arbitrary awards arrive online, in a random order, and a single decis…
Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin +1
We provide prophet inequality algorithms for online weighted matching in general (non-bipartite) graphs, under two well-studied arrival models, namely edge arrival and vertex arriv…
Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Dichotomous Valuations
Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige
We consider the problem of allocating a set on indivisible items to players with private preferences in an efficient and fair way. We focus on valuations that have dichotomous marg…
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
The endowment effect, coined by Nobel Laureate Richard Thaler, posits that people tend to inflate the value of items they own. This bias was studied, both theoretically and empiric…