6 citations · 16 across the 24 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers · 1 filter
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Secretary
Tomer Ezra, Tamar Garbuz
We study the classic single-choice prophet secretary problem through a resource augmentation lens. Our goal is to bound the -competition complexity for different classes of…
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities with Correlations
Tomer Ezra, Tamar Garbuz
We initiate the study of the prophet inequality problem through the resource augmentation framework in scenarios when the values of the rewards are correlated. Our goal is to deter…
Prophet Inequality from Samples: Is the More the Merrier?
Tomer Ezra
We study a variant of the single-choice prophet inequality problem where the decision-maker does not know the underlying distribution and has only access to a set of samples from t…
Universal Optimization for Non-Clairvoyant Subadditive Joint Replenishment
Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi, Michał Pawłowski +2
The online joint replenishment problem (JRP) is a fundamental problem in the area of online problems with delay. Over the last decade, several works have studied generalizations of…
Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design, paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper…
Contract Design for Sequential Actions
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
We introduce a novel model of contracts with combinatorial actions that accounts for sequential and adaptive agent behavior. As in the standard model, a principal delegates the exe…
Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang
In Bayesian online settings, every element has a value that is drawn from a known underlying distribution, which we refer to as the element's identity. The elements arrive sequenti…
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities
Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting +3
We study the classic single-choice prophet inequality problem through a resource augmentation lens. Our goal is to bound the -competition complexity of different t…
Multi-Parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization
Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker
We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximizat…
Contract Design Beyond Hidden-Actions
Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi, Matteo Russo
In the classical principal-agent hidden-action contract model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. In order to complete the task, the agent chooses an…