6 citations · 16 across the 24 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Combinatorial Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset o…
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
We introduce a model of competing agents in a prophet setting, where rewards arrive online, and decisions are made immediately and irrevocably. The rewards are unknown from the out…
Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements
Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents, with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well established notion of the maximin sh…
Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair-Share Allocations
Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations, when agents have equal entitlements to the goods, and there are no transf…