Consistent Sets and Contrary Inferences: Reply to Griffiths and Hartle
arXiv:gr-qc/9808016 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.81.1982
Abstract
It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections and , belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that and . To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences and where . Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.
4 pages, TeX with harvmac; typo fixed. To appear in Phys. Rev. Lett
References in corpus (2)
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