Evolutionary minority game with heterogeneous strategy distribution

Abstract

We present detailed numerical results for a modified form of the so-called Minority Game, which provides a simplified model of a competitive market. Each agent has a limited set of strategies, and competes to be in a minority. An evolutionary rule for strategy modification is included to mimic simple learning. The results can be understood by considering crowd formation within the population.

Revtex file + 4 figures

References in corpus (2)

• Statistical mechanics of systems with heterogeneous agents: Minority Games
• Phase Transition and Symmetry Breaking in the Minority Game

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