Evolutionary Minority Game: The Roles of Response Time and Mutation Threshold
arXiv:cond-mat/0402028 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.69.066122
Abstract
In the evolutionary minority game, agents are allowed to evolve their strategies (``mutate'') based on past experience. We explore the dependence of the system's global behavior on the response time and the mutation threshold of the agents. We find that the precise values of these parameters determine if the strategy distribution of the population has a U-shape, inverse-U-shape, or a W-shape. It is shown that in a free society (market), highly adaptive agents (with short response times) perform best. In addition, ``patient'' agents (with high mutation threshold) outperform ``nervous'' ones.
4 pages, 6 figures
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