Temporal oscillations and phase transitions in the evolutionary minority game

Abstract

The study of societies of adaptive agents seeking minority status is an active area of research. Recently, it has been demonstrated that such systems display an intriguing phase-transition: agents tend to {\it self-segregate} or to {\it cluster} according to the value of the prize-to-fine ratio, $R$. We show that such systems do {\it not} establish a true stationary distribution. The winning-probabilities of the agents display temporal oscillations. The amplitude and frequency of the oscillations depend on the value of $R$. The temporal oscillations which characterize the system explain the transition in the global behavior from self-segregation to clustering in the $R<1$ case.

5 pages, 5 figures

References in corpus (5)

• Self-Segregation vs. Clustering in the Evolutionary Minority Game
• Theory of the evolutionary minority game
• Generalized strategies in the Minority Game
• Evolutionary minority game with heterogeneous strategy distribution
• Self organization in a minority game: the role of memory and a probabilistic approach

Cited by in corpus (8)

• Time-Dependent Random Walks and the Theory of Complex Adaptive Systems
• Comment on "Self segregation versus clustering in the Evolutionary Minority Game"
• Theory of Phase Transition in the Evolutionary Minority Game
• Strategy updating rules and strategy distributions in dynamical multiagent systems
• Evolutionary Minority Game: The Roles of Response Time and Mutation Threshold
• Order and disorder in the Local Evolutionary Minority Game
• Theory of the Three-Group Evolutionary Minority Game
• Survival probabilities in time-dependent random walks