Social organization in the Minority Game model

Abstract

We study the role of imitation within the Minority Game model of market. The players can exchange information locally, which leads to formation of groups which act as if they were single players. Coherent spatial areas of rich and poor agents result. We found that the global effectivity is optimized at certain value of the imitation probability, which decreases with increasing memory length. The social tensions are suppressed for large imitation probability, but generally the requirements of high global effectivity and low social tensions are in conflict.

6 pages, 7 figures, submitted to Physica A

References in corpus (9)

• Emergence of scaling in random networks
• Statistical mechanics of systems with heterogeneous agents: Minority Games
• Modeling Market Mechanism with Minority Game
• Phase Transition and Symmetry Breaking in the Minority Game
• Self-organized Networks of Competing Boolean Agents
• Minority game with arbitrary cutoffs
• Capital flow in a two-component dynamical system
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Cited by in corpus (6)

• Coordination of Decisions in a Spatial Agent Model
• Harms and benefits from social imitation
• The Emergence of Leadership in Social Networks
• Effects of substrate network topologies on competition dynamics
• Order and disorder in the Local Evolutionary Minority Game
• Diversity of scales makes an advantage: The case of the Minority Game