Minority game with arbitrary cutoffs

Abstract

We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the actual attendance is above or below L. For L-> N/2, the game reproduces the main features of Challet and Zhang's minority game. As L is lowered, however, the mean attendances in different runs tend to divide into two groups. The corresponding standard deviations for these two groups are very different. This grouping effect results from the dynamical feedback governing the game's time-evolution, and is not reproduced if the agents are fed a random history.

4 pages (Revtex) + 6 separate pdf figures

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