Combined effect of incentives and coupling in multigames in two-layer networks
arXiv:2501.07193 · doi:10.1088/2632-072X/ada844
Abstract
The lack of cooperation can easily result in inequality among members of a society, which provides an increasing gap between individual incomes. To tackle this issue, we introduce an incentive mechanism based on individual strategies and incomes, wherein a portion of the income from defectors is allocated to reward low-income cooperators, aiming to enhance cooperation by improving the equitable distribution of wealth across the entire population. Moreover, previous research has typically employed network structures or game mechanisms characterized by homogeneity. In this study, we present a network framework that more accurately reflects real-world conditions, where agents are engaged in multiple games, including prisoner's dilemma games in the top-layer and public good games in the down-layer networks. Within this framework, we introduce the concept of ``external coupling'' which connects agents across different networks as acquaintances, thereby facilitating access to shared datasets. Our results indicate that the combined positive effects of external coupling and incentive mechanism lead to optimal cooperation rates and lower Gini coefficients, demonstrating a negative correlation between cooperation and inequality. From a micro-level perspective, this phenomenon primarily arises from the regular network, whereas suboptimal outcomes are observed within the scale-free network. These observations help to give a deeper insight into the interplay between cooperation and wealth disparity in evolutionary games in large populations.
17 pages, 7 figures, accepted for publication in Journal of Physics: Complexity
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